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This article discusses evidence exclusion under Swiss, Dutch and the ECtHR’s case law. 
It is shown that different national rules can still lead to similar outcomes. This can be 
explained by the influence of the ECtHR’s case law and by common normative under-
pinnings of evidence law. In all systems there are cases of strict exclusion of evidence 
(e.g., torture). If evidence cannot be strictly excluded courts apply a balancing 
approach. They consider among other factors the seriousness of the crime. Illegally 
obtained evidence can thus be used, if a serious crime is at stake. It is argued that this 
seriousness-argument not only fails to serve the objectives of evidence exclusion 
(deterrence, protection of rights etc.), but for the defendant it means that the bigger 
the crime he is accused of the smaller becomes his chance of a fair trial.
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1 Introduction
Imagine the following standard case: the police believe that drugs are being 
sold at an apartment. They decide to search the apartment. As they still have 
some doubts as to the reliability of their suspicion they choose not to involve 
the prosecutor nor to obtain a search warrant. During their search they find 
enormous quantities of drugs. The two tenants are arrested and questioned. It 
turns out that large drug deals had been struck at the apartment. At the trial 
the defence claims that the main piece of evidence, the drugs seized, had been 
illegally obtained and must therefore be excluded from the proceedings. The 
court acknowledges that the search was unlawful but nevertheless admits the 
evidence. It argues that the failure to obtain a search warrant constitutes only 
a minor violation of procedural rules. Therefore, the public interest in having 
the two tenants convicted for serious drug crimes must prevail.
This case is fictitious, yet the court’s reasoning is not. As will be shown in 
this paper, courts regularly balance the interests of the accused against the 
public interests in truth-finding and conviction. At first sight, this argument 
seems logical and grounded in common sense. Serious crimes require serious 
responses. The material truth is widely viewed as being more important than 
the mere technicalities of criminal proceedings. A closer look, however, raises 
doubts as to whether the seriousness of an alleged crime can ever be a good 
argument for disregarding procedural rules. Consequently, it may be the case 
that the bigger the crime, the smaller the chance of a fair trial.
In both Dutch and Swiss criminal procedure, the question of how courts should 
respond to unlawful police and prosecutorial conduct is a hotly debated topic.1 
1 R. Kuiper, Vormfouten. Juridische consequenties van vormverzuimen in strafzaken (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 2014); M.J. Borgers, ‘De toekomst van 359a Sv’, 25 Delikt & Delinkwent (2012) 257–273; 
M.J. Borgers and T. Kooijmans, ‘Alternatieven voor rechterlijke controle op vormverzuimen’, 
in M. Groenhuijsen, T. Kooijmans and J. Ouwerkerk (eds), Roosachtig Strafrecht (Deventer: 
Kluwer, 2013), p. 17 ff.; For Switzerland see: L. Vetterli, Gesetzesbindung im Strafprozess, Zur 
Geltung von Verwertungsverboten und ihrer Fernwirkung nach illegalen Zwangsmassnahmen 
(Zürich: Schulthess, 2010); R. Fornito, Beweisverbote im schweizerischen Strafprozess 
(St. Gallen, 2000); D. Häring, ‘Verwertbarkeit rechtswidrig erlangter Beweise gemäss 
Schweizerischer Strafprozessordnung — alte Zöpfe oder substanzielle Neuerungen?’, 127 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht [ZStrR] (2009) 225–257; S. Gless, ‘Heiligt der Zweck 
die Mittel? Beweisverbote im vereinheitlichten eidgenössischen Strafprozess’, in M.A. Niggli, 
J. Hurtado and N. Queloz (eds), Festschrift für Franz Riklin (Zürich: Schulthess, 2007), p. 399 
ff.; at p. 412; H. Vest and A. Eicker, ‘Bundesgericht. I. Öffentlichrechtliche Abteilung, 18.5.2004. 
Y. c. X. und Staatsanwaltschaft sowie Obergericht des Kantons Aargau, staatsrechtliche 
Beschwerde. bge 130 i 126’, Aktuelle Juristische Praxis [ajp] (2005) 883–892; W. Wohlers, 
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Both jurisdictions allow for unlawfully obtained evidence to be admitted at trial if 
the alleged crime is sufficiently serious. However, they reach this result in very dif-
ferent ways. This makes these states an interesting case for a comparative analysis. 
We will first demonstrate that both systems have comparable responses to unlaw-
ful state conduct in general (Section 2). The focus of this paper lies on one of these 
responses, namely the exclusion of evidence (Section 3). In Swiss law there are 
detailed statutory regulations (Section 3.1); whereas in Dutch law the exclusionary 
rules are mainly set up by the Supreme Court (Section 3.2). Both systems are influ-
enced by the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’; Section 3.3). 
We will show that comparable cases of unlawful police and prosecutorial behav-
iour are decided accordingly. The assumption is that the underlying principles of 
evidence exclusion are the same in all three jurisdictions (Section 4). The factors 
considered in evidence exclusion (Section  4.1) and the purposes pursued with 
exclusion (Section 4.2) are almost identical. This will allow us to tackle the question 
of whether the seriousness of the crime at stake is a valid argument when deciding 
on evidence exclusion (Section 4.3). In the end we will resume the main findings 
and come back to the example in the introduction (Section 5).
2 General Consequences of Unlawful State Conduct
There is a whole array of possible reactions to unlawful behaviour. If the police 
engage in criminal activities in order to obtain evidence then they can be held 
criminally liable for such conduct. For example, a policeman who tortures a 
defendant or coerces him into a confession may face charges including assault, 
coercion, threatening behaviour or abuse of public office.2 Alternatively, a 
prosecutor who violates procedural regulations may have to face disciplinary 
sanctions.3 Further, anyone affected by police and prosecutorial misconduct 
can sue the state for compensation.4 Beside these “collateral” consequences of 
misconduct, courts can also impose measures within the criminal proceed-
ings. We now turn to these procedural sanctions.5
Bundesgericht, i. Öff.-r. Abt., 3 May 2005, x. c. StA/BL, st. B. (1P.570/2004, bge 131 i 272), 
Bemerkungen, Aktuelle Juristische Praxis (2006) 627 ff.
2 See, e.g., ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany [gc], no. 22978/05, para. 122.
3 D. Häring supra (fn. 1), p. 243.
4 Article 146 Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation of 18 April 1999– State liability.
5 S. Gless and J. Martin, Water Always Finds Its Way — Discretion and the Concept of 
Exclusionary Rules in the Swiss Criminal Procedure Code, in M. Caianiello and J.S. Hodgson 
(eds), Discretionary Criminal Justice in a Comparative Context (Durham, nc: Carolina 
Academic Press, 2015), p. 162 ff.
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The influence of courts on the investigative phase of criminal proceedings in 
The Netherlands can be traced back to the 1960s. As a result of the growing public 
awareness of fundamental rights and the influence of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (‘echr’), courts imposed standardised reactions to unlawful 
police and prosecutorial conduct.6 This case law later became black letter law. 
Pursuant to Article 359a ccp/nl courts may respond to procedural violations 
with the following sanctions: (1) mitigation of the sentence imposed, (2) the 
exclusion of the evidence obtained, or (3) a permanent stay of proceedings.
In Switzerland there is no statutory provision comparable to Article 359a ccp/nl 
that puts up general rules regarding the consequences of police and prosecutorial 
misconduct. Nor has the Federal Supreme Court set up a general rule of the kind. 
There are only a few individual provisions.7 According to the case law, excessively 
long criminal proceedings may lead to a recognition of the excessive duration, a 
mitigated sentence, a conviction without sanction, or the total stay of the proceed-
ings.8 The only norm which in a general manner deals with unlawful state behav-
iour is Article 141 of the Swiss Federal Code of Criminal Procedure (ccp/ch).9 It 
regulates evidence exclusion and will be discussed in the next section.
3 Exclusion of Evidence
3.1 Swiss Law
Article 141 ccp/ch sets up five levels of evidence exclusion,10 descending from 
strict exclusion to full admissibility.
6 P. Spierenburg, Please, please me’s number one (Den Haag: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 
2013) p. 30 ff.; T. Spronken, Verdediging. Een onderzoek naar de normering van het optreden 
van advocaten in strafzaken (Deventer: Gouda Quint, 2001) p. 125 ff.
7 E.g., Article 293 iv ccp/ch; F. Meyer, ‘Neues zu den Rechtsfolgen unzulässiger 
Tatprovokation, zugleich Besprechung von egmr v. 23.10.2014, Nr. 54648/09, Furcht v. 
Germany’, Forum poenale (2015) p. 176 ff.
8 Federal Supreme Court Decision (available online at http: //www.servat.unibe.ch/dfr/dfr 
_bge07.html) bge 117 iv 124 consid. 4.d; S.J. Summers, in M.A. Niggli, M. Heer and 
H. Wiprächtiger (eds), Basler Kommentar, Schweizerische Strafprozessordnung — 
Jugendstrafprozessordnung, 2nd edn (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2014), Article 5 N 15 
f.; H. Wiprächtiger and S. Keller, in M.A. Niggli and H. Wiprächtiger (eds), Basler Kommentar, 
Strafrecht I, 3rd edn (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2013), Article 47 N 178 ff.
9 English translation by Swiss Government (http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified 
-compilation/20052319/index.html), ccp/ch (Gov); Translation by S.J. Summers, in 
A. Donatsch, T. Hansjakob and V. Lieber (eds), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen 
Strafprozessordnung (StPO), 2nd edn (Zürich: Schulthess, 2014), ccp/ch (Summers).
10 D. Häring, supra (fn. 1), p. 237 ff.
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On the first level, evidence is strictly11 excluded from any criminal proceed-
ings if it has been gathered by coercion, violence, threats, promises, deception 
or methods that interfere with an accused’s free will.12 Evidence obtained by 
torture or through inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 3 echr), is cate-
gorically excluded. There is no balancing of interests.13
On the second level, evidence is strictly excluded if the Code explicitly declares 
evidence to be inadmissible.14 At the start of the first interview the accused must 
be informed that he is entitled to remain silent and to appoint a defence law-
yer.15 Article 158 II ccp/ch explicitly states that any evidence obtained without 
these cautions is strictly inadmissible.16 There is no balancing of interests and 
no reasoning about the epistemological value of such evidence.17
On the third level, evidence is generally excluded if the criminal justice 
authorities have obtained it in a “criminal manner” (Article 141 II ccp/ch).18 
What the legislator meant can be illustrated with Schenk v. Switzerland.19 Pierre 
Schenk was suspected to have hired a hitman to kill his wife, Josette Schenk. 
The designated hitman, instead of executing his mission, secretly taped a 
phone conversation with Pierre Schenk. This tape was subsequently used as 
the main piece of evidence in Schenk’s conviction. Secret taping of phone calls 
is a criminal offence in Switzerland (Article 179ter of the Swiss Criminal Code; 
cc/ch– Unauthorised recording of conversations).20 Hence, the evidence is 
11 S. Gless and J. Martin, supra (fn. 5), p. 167 ff.; for the distinction between strictly and gener-
ally excluded evidence see S. Gless, in M.A. Niggli, M. Heer and H. Wiprächtiger (eds), 
Basler Kommentar, Schweizerische Strafprozessordnung — Jugendstrafprozessordnung, 
2nd edn (Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2014), Article 141 N 15 f.
12 Articles 140 I and 141 I clause 1 ccp/ch.
13 S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 47.
14 Article 141 I clause 2 ccp/ch.
15 G. Godenzi, in A. Donatsch, T. Hansjakob and V. Lieber (eds), Kommentar zur 
Schweizerischen Strafprozessordnung (StPO), 2nd edn (Zürich: Schulthess, 2014), Article 
158 N 9 ff.; N. Ruckstuhl, in M.A. Niggli and M. Heer and H. Wiprächtiger (eds), Basler 
Kommentar, Schweizerische Strafprozessordnung — Jugendstrafprozessordnung, 2nd edn 
(Basel: Helbing Lichtenhahn Verlag, 2014), Article 158 N 19 ff.
16 G. Godenzi, supra (fn. 15), Article 158 N 33 ff.; N. Ruckstuhl, supra (fn. 15), Article 158 N 33 
ff.; for more examples S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 48 ff.
17 See S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 48.
18 L. Ottinger, ‘L’exploitation des moyens de preuves obtenus illégalement: de la situation 
actuelle à celle du cpp unifié’, Jusletter (24 August 2009); See also G. Hersch, ‘Die 
Verwertbarkeit rechtswidrig erlangter Beweise gemäss Art.141 Abs. 2 StPO: Kodifizierung 
der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichts?’, 130 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht 
(2012) 352–372, at 365.
19 See ECtHR, Schenk v. Switzerland [Plenary], no. 10862/84; bge 109 Ia 244.
20 G. Godenzi, Private Beweisbeschaffung im Strafprozess (Zürich: Schulthess, 2008) p. 161 ff.
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generally excluded.21 General exclusion means that unlawfully obtained evi-
dence is not admissible, but that there are exceptions.22 When courts assess 
the general admissibility of evidence they have to engage in a balancing exer-
cise.23 The private interests of the accused have to be balanced against the 
public interests in truth finding and conviction.24 The graver the alleged crime 
the likelier that the public interests prevail.25 Not surprisingly, the courts 
decided that the public interest in resolving the murder charges overrode 
Pierre Schenk’s private interest in the confidentiality of his phone call.26 The 
tapes were thus admitted as evidence.
On the fourth level, evidence is again generally excluded if the criminal jus-
tice authorities have obtained it in violation of ‘validity rules’ (Article 141 ii 
ccp/ch). These are rules designed to protect the fundamental rights of the 
accused. At examination hearings witnesses have to be informed of their duty to 
tell the truth. If this caution is not given “the examination hearing is invalid” 
(Article 177 i ccp/ch). Despite its denomination, ‘invalidity’ does not necessar-
ily mean that evidence is unusable. If a validity rule is breached, Article 141 ii 
ccp/ch again applies. Evidence is generally excluded unless the alleged crime 
is sufficiently serious that there is a public interest in its inclusion. This assess-
ment requires the courts to engage in the aforementioned balancing process.27
21 S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 64; for further examples, see N. Schmid, Schweizerische 
Strafprozessordnung (StPO), Praxiskommentar, 2nd edn (Zürich and St. Gallen: Dike, 2013), 
Article 141 N 6; Federal Council Dispatch on the unification of the Swiss Laws on Criminal 
Procedure of 21 December 2005, BBl 2006 p. 1085 ff., 1183 (http://www.admin.ch/opc/de/
federal-gazette/2006/1085.pdf).
22 S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 14, 63 ff. ; S. Gless and J. Martin supra (fn. 5), pp. 168 f.
23 D. Häring, supra (fn. 1), p. 243 f. (“klassischen Interessenabwägung”); S. Gless and J. Martin 
supra (fn. 5), p. 171; partly different W. Wohlers, in A. Donatsch, T. Hansjakob and V. Lieber 
(eds), Kommentar zur Schweizerischen Strafprozessordnung (StPO), 2nd edn (Zürich: 
Schulthess, 2014), Article 141 N 20; dissenting G. Hersch, supra (fn. 18), p. 371; In the past the 
Swiss Courts also had to assess whether illegally obtained evidence could also have been 
obtained in accordance with the law, see bge 131 I 272 consid. 4.1; L. Ottinger, supra (fn. 18), 
Jusletter II.3; L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), p. 63; rightly rejecting this argument J.D. Jackson and 
S.J. Summers, The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence, Beyond the Common Law and 
Civil Law Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) p. 191 f.
24 Federal Supreme Court Decision of 7 September 1983, cited after ECtHR, Schenk v. 
Switzerland [Plenary], no. 10862/84, para. 30 (=bge 109 Ia 244 consid. 2b).
25 bge 130 I 126 consid. 3.2; see also bge 131 I 272 consid. 4.1.2.
26 ECtHR, Schenk v. Switzerland [Plenary], no. 10862/84, para. 30, 49.
27 See for criticism: W. Wohlers, supra (fn. 23), Article 141 N 19 ff.; S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), 
Article 141 N 79 ff., 84; L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), p. 16 ff.; D. Häring, supra (fn. 1), p. 245 ff.; 
R. Fornito, supra (fn. 1), p. 246 ff., 252; for “fishing expeditions” see bge 137 I 218 consid. 2.3.2.
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On the fifth level, evidence “obtained in violation of administrative rules 
shall be usable”.28 Whilst a violation of an administrative rule may lead to dis-
ciplinary sanctions, the evidence remains fully admissible. ‘Administrative 
rules’ are designed to guarantee the smooth administration of criminal pro-
ceedings.29 They are one level beneath the ‘validity rules’ as their violation 
should — by definition — not result in an infringement of the accused’s per-
sonal interests. However, it is very hard to draw a clear line. The rule that an 
expert witness has to be reminded of his duty to tell the truth has been regarded 
as an administrative rule.30 Some view the duty to get a search warrant as an 
administrative rule.31 According to the Supreme Court, a provision regarding 
the physical search of mobile phones is only of administrative nature.32 It is 
difficult to conceive how there is no interference with the accused’s interests in 
these cases.
The levels of evidence exclusion under Swiss law can be summed up by 
referring to the example in the introduction. If the information about the drug 
deals had been obtained coercively, or without cautioning the tenants, evi-
dence would be strictly unusable. If the police had forged a search warrant in 
order to get into the apartment, the evidence would have been gathered in a 
“criminal manner” (Article 317 cc/ch — Forgery of a document by a public 
official). Still, this would not lead to automatic exclusion. It could be admis-
sible if the drug offences were deemed to be sufficiently serious.33 If the 
police had searched the house without authorization, the consequences 
depend on whether the duty to obtain a search warrant is viewed as a validity 
28 Article 141 iii ccp/ch (Summers, fn. 9).
29 On procedural provisions as “mere suggestions”, see M. Caianiello, Procedural Sanctions 
in the eu Framework: Toward a Harmless Error Doctrine and Practice, in M. Caianiello 
and J.S. Hodgson, Discretionary Criminal Justice in a Comparative Context (Durham, nc: 
Carolina Academic Press, 2015), p. 208; and M. Caianiello, ‘To Sanction (or not to Sanction) 
Procedural Flaws at eu Level, A Step forward in the Creation of an eu Criminal Process’, 
22 European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice (2014) 317–329, at 319.
30 Decision by the Court of Cassation of the Canton of Sankt Gallen, 27 October 1967, St. 
Gallische Gerichts- und Verwaltungspraxis (gvp/sg) (1967) no. 54; N. Oberholzer, 
Grundzüge des Strafprozessrechts (Bern: Stämpfli, 2012) 3rd edition N 813.
31 For references, see D. Häring, supra (fn. 1), p. 241 and N. Burger-Mittner and S. Burger, ‘Die 
„freiwillige“ Hausdurchsuchung im schweizerischen Strafprozess’, forumpoenale (2012) 
p. 307 ff., 309; bge 96 i 437 consid. 3, 139 iv 128 consid. 1.7.
32 bge 139 iv 128 consid. 1.7.
33 S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 64 ; the fact that the search was performed without due 
cause could be another ground for exclusion, see bge 139 iv 128 E. 2.1 (“fishing 
expeditions”).
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or an administrative rule.34 In the latter case it would be fully admissible. 
In the former, the public interests in conviction would have to be weighed 
against the accused’s right to privacy.
3.2 Dutch Law
The Dutch law on the exclusion of evidence is more flexible and mostly devel-
oped via case law. Courts can address violations of procedural rules that have 
occurred during the investigative proceedings35 via Article 359a ccp/nl.36 
This article — unlike Article 141 of the Swiss Code — does not make a distinc-
tion between the types of procedural rules that have been breached.37 Thus, in 
principle it applies to all types of procedural rules, whether they protect funda-
mental rights of the accused or the efficiency of the proceedings; unless the 
violation can still be repaired.38 In deciding what remedy would be most 
appropriate “the court takes into account the relevance of the breached provi-
sion, the seriousness of the violation and the damage caused by the violation”. 
These factors need to be considered regardless of the remedy that is chosen 
(mitigation of sentence, exclusion of evidence, or a stay of proceedings). In 
2004, the Supreme Court ruled on the interpretation of Article 359a ccp/nl 
that evidence can only be excluded if the unlawful conduct that had led to the 
discovery of this evidence, constitutes a significant breach of an important 
procedural provision.39 In 2013 more detailed rules for evidence exclusion 
were set up by the Supreme Court.40 The case that led to this concerned an 
unauthorized search of a home resulting in the discovery of large quantities of 
cannabis, as well as installations for growing cannabis plants. At trial the 
defence argued that the evidence obtained by the unlawful search of the home 
should be excluded.
34 Controversial; see D. Häring, supra (fn. 1), p. 241; N. Burger-Mittner and S. Burger, supra 
(fn. 31), p. 309; bge 96 i 437; Dispatch 2005, supra (fn. 21), p. 1183.
35 An example is investigations done in the context of intelligence and security services 
(Dutch Supreme Court 5 September 2006, ecli:nl:hr:2006:av4122).
36 Violations committed by private persons generally do not fall under this article (Dutch 
Supreme Court 14 January 2003, ecli:nl:hr:2003:ae9038).
37 As will be shown below the case law of the Supreme Court does make such distinctions in 
deciding which violations can be remedied through the exclusion of evidence.
38 Such is the case when for instance the defendant is not granted the opportunity to con-
duct a counter analysis. According to the Supreme Court this can be remedied by granting 
such an opportunity at a later stage (Dutch Supreme Court 1 November 2005, ecli:nl:hr
:2005:au2239).
39 Dutch Supreme Court 30 March 2004, ecli:nl:hr:2004:am2533, para. 3.4.2.
40 Dutch Supreme Court 19 February 2013, ecli:nl:hr:2013:by5321.
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The Supreme Court concluded that the exclusion of evidence is only war-
ranted in three instances, namely where (1) the unlawful act directly affects the 
right to a fair trial under Article 6 echr; (2) there is a significant breach of an 
important procedural provision or principle — other than Article 6; and finally 
(3) the defence can show the existence of exceptional circumstances in which 
a particular procedural violation has been so frequent that it can be consid-
ered structural.
The first category leads to strict exclusion of evidence. It includes the viola-
tion of the right to counsel during police interrogations (known as the Salduz-
exception),41 statements of the defendant elicited by a police informant,42 or 
evidence gathered in violation of Article 3 echr.43 In these situations the 
courts must exclude the illegally obtained evidence and no balancing of inter-
ests takes place.
The second category concerns breaches of important procedural provisions 
that do not violate the right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, the exclusion of evi-
dence is deemed a necessary measure to prevent future procedural irregulari-
ties. Examples are an unlawful body cavity search, or the use of privileged 
communications.44 Unlike the first category where the exclusionary rule is 
applied in a strict manner, this second category explicitly demands that courts 
weigh the pros and cons in order to apply the exclusionary rule. The exclusion 
of evidence under this category is therefore warranted only in the case of a 
significant violation of a fundamental right of the accused.
The third category concerns structural violations of procedural rules by 
police or prosecution. The defence must prove that responsible authorities 
have not done enough to prevent such violations. The prosecutor can then 
demonstrate that adequate remedies have been taken. The court again has to 
engage in a balancing exercise and explain why the exclusion of evidence will 
have a deterrent effect on the police and prosecution. Because of the high 
threshold to be met by the defence this category has never been applied in 
practice.
As mentioned the first category is a strict exclusion of evidence, whereas the 
second and third require courts to engage in a balancing exercise. In doing so 
courts should take account of the following factors:
41 ECtHR, Salduz v. Turkey [gc], no. 36391/02.
42 ECtHR, Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, no. 25829/94.
43 ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany [gc], no. 22978/05.
44 Dutch Supreme Court 29 May 2007, ecli:nl:hr:2007:az8795; Dutch Supreme Court 
12 January 1999, ecli:nl:hr:1999:zd1402; Dutch Supreme Court 2 October 2007, ecli:nl
:hr:2007:ba5632.
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First it must be established that an important right of the accused has been 
breached. Does the violated procedural rule protect important rights or inter-
ests of the accused? This rule is referred to as the Schutznorm. In a 2004 case an 
illegal search of the premises led to the discovery of contraband. The Supreme 
Court dictated that the breached rule seeks to protect the privacy and inviola-
bility of the occupant’s home. Considering that the defendant was not the 
occupant of the premises, but merely used the house to store the contraband, 
his interests were not harmed according to the Schutznorm and therefore evi-
dence was not excluded.45
The second factor is the graveness of the violation. To what extent have the 
law enforcement authorities deliberately violated the procedural rule?46 In 
cases of deliberate violations, the exclusion of evidence is more appropriate as 
it will meaningfully deter the police. Consequently, a violation committed in 
good faith will not easily lead to the exclusion of the obtained evidence.47
The third factor mentioned in Article 359a ccp/nl is the harm caused by the 
violation. Generally it can be stated that the graver the harm that is caused to 
the defendant’s right, the more appropriate the exclusion of the evidence will 
be. If the police destroy crucial information, rendering it impossible for the 
defendant to challenge the underlying evidence, the judge will exclude that evi-
dence due to the harm caused to the defendant’s rights.48 An exemplary case is 
where the police had destroyed a car that was involved in a serious car accident. 
Before the car was destroyed investigators had conducted forensic investiga-
tions on the car and had written a report on their findings. When the defence 
later requested additional investigations to be conducted on the car, it turned 
out that this was not possible as the car was destroyed. The court decided that 
as the right of the defence to challenge the evidence was rendered impossible 
by the conduct of the police, the written report of the forensic investigators 
could not be used at trial and therefore excluded it from evidence. The basic 
thought is that the accused has suffered harm due to the violation, and this 
harm needs to be compensated. So for instance, if a defendant has not been 
notified of his right to remain silent, one can establish that this procedural rule 
seeks to protect the right of the accused. Thereby establishing the Schutznorm. 
45 There are some exceptions, such as the wire-tapping of a lawyer and the co-accused: 
Dutch Supreme Court 12 January 1999, ecli:nl:hr:zd1402.
46 This factor can also be found in the case law of the us Supreme Court. See for instance in 
R.M. Re, ‘The Due Process Exclusionary Rule’, 127 Harvard Law Review (2005) 1885–1966, at 1895.
47 Dutch Supreme Court 19 June 2001, ecli:nl:hr:2001:AB2202; contra M. Caianiello supra 
(fn. 29), p. 318.
48 Dutch Supreme Court 23 January 2001, ecli:nl:hr:2001:aa9594.
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However, if the accused does not give any statement, or merely states his name, 
one should conclude that no actual damage was done.49 Implicitly this factor 
refers to the harm caused to the fair trial rights of the defendant, thus violations 
of privacy rights will not easily render the exclusion of evidence.
A fourth factor — not mentioned in Article 359a ccp/nl — is the serious-
ness of the crime at stake.50 This is especially important in cases where the 
exclusion of evidence would result in an (mandatory) acquittal. One of the 
reasons given for considering the graveness of the crime is that serious crimes 
should not go unpunished just because public authorities have made minor 
mistakes.51 The Supreme Court demands that the public interest in conviction 
is weighed against the individual interests of the defendant. It also looks on 
positive obligations that derive from human rights law. In the Supreme Court’s 
view the exclusion of evidence can, under certain circumstances (when the 
prosecution of a serious crime is at stake), be inconsistent with these positive 
obligations, as it can interfere with the state’s duty to put in place an effective 
prosecution and punishment of the crime at stake.52 In this view human rights 
law imposes both an obligation to protect the defendant’s rights, as well as 
positive obligations that seek to protect victim’s rights (the duty to prevent, 
suppress and sanction breaches of serious human rights violations).53 This 
conflict of obligations should be taken into account by the court in deciding on 
evidence exclusion. Thus, when the breach of the defendant’s rights can be 
remedied by other means, such as a mitigation of the sentence, the Supreme 
Court argues that this is a more appropriate remedy in light of the public inter-
est in general and the rights of the victims of the crime.
In a case concerning the unlawful frisking of a defendant, where a weapon 
was found, the court decided that the exclusion of evidence would not be a 
proper remedy as it would make the conviction of the defendant impossible. 
Considering the gravity of the offence, it instead chose to mitigate the sentence 
as a remedy for the violation of the defendant’s right.54 The reversed result is 
49 Since the 2013 ruling this example would fall under the first category, the strict exclusion.
50 Dutch Supreme Court 25 June 2002, ecli:nl:hr:2002:ad9204.
51 See the annotation under Dutch Supreme Court 9 May 2000, ecli:nl:hr:2000:aa5732, 
nj 2000, 521.
52 See for positive obligations under human rights law for instance ECtHR, Osman v United 
Kingdom [gc], no. 23452/94; ECtHR, X & Y v. The Netherlands, no. 8978/80; and P.H.P.H.M.C. 
van Kempen, Repressie door mensenrechten (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2008) p. 15 ff.
53 This view of the Supreme Court is strongly influenced by F. Vellinga-Schootstra and 
W.H. Vellinga‚ Positive obligations‘ en het Nederlandse Strafprocesrecht (Nijmegen: Ars 
Aequi Libri, 1998).
54 Dutch Supreme Court 25 June 2002, ecli:nl:hr:2002:ad9204.
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that in the prosecution of ‘minor offences’, violations of procedural rules are 
not tolerated as they outweigh the crime at stake.
In conclusion, it should be clear from the discussed case law that the 
Supreme Court is very reluctant to apply the exclusionary rule. In principle, 
only violations of procedural rules that infringe the right to a fair trial of the 
accused are remedied through the exclusion of the unlawfully obtained evi-
dence.55 This is only a small category of procedural violations. Violations of 
other rules will always be balanced against other interests. The right to a fair 
trial is not part of national Dutch law, so courts must refer to the ECtHR for the 
interpretation and meaning of this right. Thus the strict exclusionary rule is to 
a high degree dependent on the Strasbourg case law. This reliance can be prob-
lematic, as the ECtHR does not lay down general rules of admissibility of evi-
dence but rather states that this is a matter for national law to legislate for.
3.3 ECtHR
Generally the position of the ECtHR in addressing the admissibility of evi-
dence is marked by caution.56 In Schenk v. Switzerland the Court stated that 
Article 6 “does not lay down rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, 
which is primarily a matter of regulation under national law”.57 The court does 
not formulate general rules on the admissibility of evidence, but rather ascer-
tains whether the criminal proceedings as a whole have been fair.58 However, 
the Court in some cases had de facto set up such rules.
In Harutyunyan confessions were obtained by immense ill-treatment 
(squeezing of fingertips with pliers). The Court — ratione temporis — could 
not decide whether the inflicted cruelties amounted to torture. Nevertheless, 
it found that the use of such evidence rendered the trial as a whole unfair.59 
The more recent case law allows for a general interpretation that evidence 
gathered by torture (Article 3) is strictly excluded from any proceedings — 
irrespective of its probative value.60
55 M.J. Borgers and T. Kooijmans, supra (fn. 1), p. 20.
56 J.D. Jackson and S.J. Summers, supra (fn. 23), p. 151.
57 ECtHR, Schenk v. Switzerland [Plenary], para. 46; ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany [gc], no. 
54810/00, para. 94; S. Lubig and J. Sprenger, ‘Beweisverwertungsverbote aus dem 
Fairnessgebot des Art. 6 emrk in der Rechtsprechung des egmr’, 9 Zeitschrift für 
Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (2008) 433–440, at 434 ff.
58 ECtHR, Khan v. United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, para. 34; see also ECtHR, Schenk v. 
Switzerland [Plenary], para. 46; ECtHR, Allan v. United Kingdom, no. 48539/99, para. 42.
59 ECtHR, Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 36549/03, para. 61 ff.
60 ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany [gc], no. 22978/05, para. 167.
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This absolute exclusion of unlawful evidence does not, however, apply to all 
Article 3 violations. With regard to evidence gathered by acts classified as ill-
treatment, but falling short of torture, the Court takes a more lenient approach. 
For example, in Jalloh the defendant was forced to swallow emetics in order to 
retrieve a small bag of cocaine. The ECtHR held that this inhuman treatment 
did not automatically render the proceedings unfair. But considering that the 
impugned measures were the decisive element in the conviction for a minor 
drug charge the Court concluded that overall the trial was unfair.61 In Gäfgen 
on the other hand, the trial was considered fair even though there had been a 
violation of Article 3. The applicant had kidnapped and — unbeknownst to 
the police — suffocated an 11-year-old boy. In order to make him reveal the 
boy’s whereabouts the police threatened Gäfgen with “considerable physical 
pain”. He then disclosed the location of the body. The ECtHR qualified this 
threat of torture as inhuman treatment. Nevertheless, it found no violation of 
Article 6. The ECtHR concluded that his conviction was mainly based on a sec-
ond voluntary confession, which was given at trial. It thus considered that his 
trial as a whole had been fair.62
The ECtHR has also considered that the violation of fair trial rights can lead 
to inadmissibility. In its landmark decision Salduz the applicant’s right of 
access to a lawyer was restricted during his police custody. Salduz’ statement to 
the police was used for his conviction. The court decided that “neither the 
assistance provided subsequently by a lawyer nor the adversarial nature of the 
ensuing proceedings could cure the defects which had occurred during police 
custody”.63 His defence rights had thus been irretrievably affected.64
A violation of the privilege against self-incrimination can also lead to inad-
missibility. In Saunders evidence given to administrative inspectors without 
allowing the accused to be silent was subsequently used in criminal proceed-
ings. The Court recalled that the right not to incriminate oneself lies at the 
heart of a fair procedure and found a violation of Article 6.65
The privilege against self-incrimination and the right to silence were also at 
stake in Allan. The applicant was in detention on a murder charge. He refused 
61 ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany [gc], no. 54810/00, para. 103 ff.
62 ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany [gc], no. 22978/05, paras 108 and 169 ff.
63 ECtHR, Salduz v. Turkey [gc], no. 36391/02, para. 58.
64 ECtHR, Salduz v. Turkey [gc], no. 36391/02, para. 62; J.D. Jackson and S.J. Summers, 
‘Confrontation with Strasbourg: uk and Swiss approaches to criminal evidence’, Criminal 
Law Review (2013) 114–130, at 125 ff.; J.R. Spencer, Strasbourg and defendant’s rights in 
criminal procedure, 70 Cambridge Law Journal (2011) 14–17.
65 ECtHR, Saunders v. United Kingdom [gc], no. 19187/91, para. 67 ff.
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to give statements to the police. A covert police collaborator was then placed 
in his cell. The elicited information was used as decisive evidence in his convic-
tion. The Court stressed the importance of the freedom to remain silent when 
questioned by the police. This freedom had been undermined and Article 6 
para. 1 of the Convention violated.66
Finally, the Court has considered many cases regarding evidence gathered 
in violation of the right to privacy (Article 8).67 It has consistently held that the 
use of evidence obtained in breach of the right to privacy does not render the 
proceedings as a whole unfair.68 In Khan a covertly recorded conversation 
among drug dealers was the only piece of evidence available. Lacking a statu-
tory basis regulating covert surveillance the evidence had been obtained in 
violation of Article 8. Still, the Court found no violation of Article 6. The 
accused had “ample opportunity to challenge both the authenticity and the 
use of the recording”. Additionally, the epistemological value of evidence was 
deemed to be very high.69
In summary, there are many different ways and means to deal with illegally 
obtained evidence. However, there is common ground too. In all three jurisdic-
tions there are categories of violations that lead to strict exclusion of evidence. 
The standard example is torture. It is deemed to be so incompatible with fair 
trial rights that it taints the entirety of the proceedings. On the other hand, 
there are violations that only in general lead to evidence exclusion. The com-
parison has shown that whenever courts have to decide whether to generally 
exclude or to admit evidence they resort to similar arguments. In the next sec-
tion we take a closer look at these arguments.
4 Normative Underpinnings of Evidence Exclusion
The above comparison suggests that there are common normative underpin-
nings of evidence exclusion. To verify this assumption we first examine the 
66 ECtHR, Allan v. United Kingdom, no. 48539/99, para. 42 ff.; compare to ECtHR, Bykov v. 
Russia [gc], no. 4378/02, para. 101 ff. Contrary to Allan, Bykov was not detained and the 
conversation had taken place at his estate. Therefore, the court considered that Bykov had 
not made the statements under psychological pressure.
67 ECtHR, Schenk v. Switzerland [Plenary], no. 10862/84; ECtHR, Klass and others v. Germany 
[Plenary], no. 5029/71; ECtHR, Kruslin v. France, no. 11801/85; ECtHR, Khan v. United 
Kingdom, no. 35394/97; ECtHR, P.G./J.H. v. United Kingdom, no. 44787/98; ECtHR, 
Dragojević v. Croatia, no. 68955/11; ECtHR, Bykov v. Russia [gc], no. 4378/02.
68 ECtHR, Dragojević v. Croatia, no. 68955/11, para. 131 ff.
69 ECtHR, Khan v. United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, paras 22 and 29 ff.
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factors weighed in determining whether evidence ought to be excluded (1). In 
the second section we look at the purposes of evidence exclusion. If unlawful 
state behaviour in all jurisdictions can lead to inadmissibility this must serve 
common ends (2). In the final section we focus on the most controversial fac-
tor used by courts, the seriousness of the crime. We will analyse this factor in 
light of the stated purposes of evidence exclusion (3).
4.1 Factors in Evidence Exclusion
4.1.1 Epistemology
The probative value of evidence is an important factor in the case law of 
the ECtHR.70 Traditionally courts hesitate to disregard reliable evidence 
merely because technicalities have not been complied with. If the episte-
mological value of evidence is high enough the ECtHR even ignores its own 
‘sole and decisive’ rule.71 In Khan a covertly recorded conversation was 
viewed to be highly reliable. The ECtHR ruled that it was justifiably admit-
ted even though it was the only piece of evidence.72 Epistemological argu-
ments can be found in Swiss case law too. The fear is that excluding reliable 
evidence would lead to “absurd results”.73 Although the Dutch Supreme 
Court does not explicitly recognise this factor, it does take into account the 
general interest in truth-finding, thereby implicitly referring to the proba-
tive value of evidence.74 The emphasis on reliability of evidence shows 
that even in modern criminal proceedings truth-finding still trumps proce-
dural rights.75
70 ECtHR, Khan v. United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, para. 37.
71 Cf. in general ECtHR, Al-Khawaja and Tahery v. The United Kingdom [gc], no. 26766/05; 
22228/06, para. 119.
72 ECtHR, Khan v. United Kingdom, no. 35394/97, para. 29 ff.; different ECtHR, Dragojević v. 
Croatia, no. 68955/11, para. 133 and ECtHR, Schenk v. Switzerland [Plenary], no. 10862/84, 
para. 48.
73 Federal Supreme Court Decision of 7 September 1983, cited after ECtHR, Schenk v. 
Switzerland [Plenary], no. 10862/84, para. 30 (=bge 109 Ia 244 consid. 2b); sceptical S. 
Gless and J. Martin supra (fn. 5), p. 164.
74 Dutch Supreme Court 30 March 2004, ecli:nl:hr:2004:am2533.
75 L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), p. 18 f.; G. Hersch, supra (fn. 18),  p. 363; M. Thommen, ‘Gerechtigkeit 
und Wahrheit im modernen Strafprozess’, recht (2014) 264–276, at 264 ff., 268 ff. For the 
relation between truth-finding and rights in Dutch law see J.H. Crijns and P.P.J. van der 
Meij, ‘Over de grenzen van de materiële waarheidsvinding’, in R.H. Haveman and 
H.C. Wiersinga (eds), Langs de randen van het strafrecht. Meijers-reeks 91 (Nijmegen: Wolf 
Legal Publishers, 2005), p. 45 ff.
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4.1.2 Damage
The second factor considered when deciding whether unlawfully obtained evi-
dence should be admitted is the “damage caused by the violation”.76 This factor 
refers to damage in a broad sense: both physical damage as well as damage to 
interests.77 Physical damage often occurs in the context of inhuman and degrad-
ing treatment (Article 3). In Jalloh the administration of emetics was deemed to 
be a “grave interference with his physical and mental integrity”.78 The suffering 
caused to him was thus an argument to render the whole proceedings unfair. 
The violation of fair trial rights (Article 6) can also cause damage to the interests 
of the accused. For example, if a failure to caution a suspect results in a self-
incriminating statement. This potential damage is the justification for giving 
the caution in the first place. Violations of privacy rights (Article 8) rarely lead 
to comparable damage and hence seldom result in evidence exclusion.
4.1.3 Seriousness of the Violation
The seriousness of the violation79 is the third factor taken into account when 
deciding on evidence exclusion. Whereas the damage-argument is about the 
impact of a violation this seriousness-argument looks at the type and degree of 
the violation. Some very serious types of violations, such as torture or the fail-
ure to grant access to a lawyer, should lead to strict exclusion of evidence. The 
degree of violation matters too. With regard to evidence gathered in a “crimi-
nal manner” or in violation of “validity rules” (Article 141 ii ccp/ch) it must be 
judged how severely rules have been broken. If the police forge a search war-
rant the violation is more severe than if they merely enter the house without 
authorization. For this reason in Dutch case law violations committed in good 
faith only rarely lead to evidence exclusion.80
4.1.4 Seriousness of Crime
As a fourth factor courts gauge the seriousness of the crime at stake. In 
Switzerland unlawfully obtained evidence can be used if it is essential “to 
secure a conviction for a serious offence” (Article 141 ii ccp/ch).81 The Dutch 
76 Article 359a ii ccp/nl; M. Caianiello, supra (fn. 29), p. 209.
77 Dutch Supreme Court 12 December 2010, ecli:nl:hr:2010:bn4163; Dutch Supreme Court 
4 January 2011, ecli:nl:hr:2011:bm6673.
78 ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany [gc], no. 54810/00, para. 82.
79 Article 359a ii ccp/nl; for Swiss Law S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 69.
80 Dutch Supreme Court 19 June 2001, ecli:nl:hr:2001:ab2202.
81 S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 72; H. Vest and A. Eicker, supra (fn. 1), p. 891; 
L. Vetterli, ‘Kehrtwende in der bundesgerichtlichen Praxis zu den Verwertungsverboten’, 130 
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Straftrecht (2012) 447–470, at 462 ff.; G. Hersch, supra (fn. 18), 
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Supreme Court considers that the exclusion of evidence is not an adequate 
remedy in serious crime cases.82 In such cases national courts generally are 
very reluctant to exclude evidence. The ECtHR’s jurisprudence on this factor is 
ambiguous.83 The Gäfgen case was about the murder of an 11-year-old boy. 
Hence, there was a huge public interest in conviction. This interest ultimately 
outweighed one of the most fundamental rights of the Convention (Article 3). 
In Salduz, however, a case concerning terrorism charges, the Court held that 
that the gravity of the crimes cannot be a valid argument to limit the right to 
counsel: “These principles are particularly called for in the case of serious 
charges”.84 However, in the recent Ibrahim decision, a case concerning terror-
ism charges too, the Court accepted “compelling reasons which justified the 
temporary delay of all four applicants’ access to lawyers.”85 Namely the immi-
nent (terrorist) threat to public safety.86
4.2 Purpose of Evidence Exclusion
As shown courts in all three systems resort to similar arguments when it comes 
to evidence exclusion. This raises the question whether they also seek to 
achieve the same goals with evidence exclusion. In this section we will discuss 
the Swiss, Dutch and ECtHR system in light of these purposes.
The exclusion of evidence as a response to unlawful state conduct can be 
justified in different ways. The most frequently stated purpose is deterrence.87 
It is often argued that the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence ‘is the only 
practical solution’ to discourage investigating authorities from unreasonable 
searches and seizures.88 In Dutch and Swiss Law deterrence is accepted as a 
p. 368 f.; A. Donatsch and C. Cavegn, ‘Ausgewählte Fragen zum Beweisrecht nach der sch-
weizerischen Strafprozessordnung’, 126 Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (2008) 
158–173, at 166.
82 Dutch Supreme Court 19 February 2013, ecli:nl:hr:2013:by5321.
83 Compare ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany [gc], no. 54810/00, para. 97 with ECtHR, Salduz v. 
Turkey [gc], no. 36391/02, para. 54.
84 ECtHR, Salduz v. Turkey [gc], no. 36391/02, para. 54.
85 ECtHR, Ibrahim and others v. United Kingdom, no. 50541/08, para. 203; Grand Chamber 
decision pending.
86 Compare with Articles 3(6) and 12 eu Directive 2013/48/eu.
87 It is also one of the oldest purposes: Boyd v. United States, 116 us 616 (1886); Weeks v. United 
States, 232 us 383 (1914); Mapp v Ohio, 367 us 643, 656 (1961); and in Europe the German 
theory of E. Beling, Die Beweisverbote als Grenzen der Wahrheitserforschung im Strafprozess 
(Darmstadt: Wissenschatliche Buchgesellschaft, 1903).
88 H.F. Way Jr., ‘Exclusion of evidence illegally obtained’, 26 Tennessee Law Review (1958–
1959) p. 332 ff., 351; ; D.A. Dripps, ‘The “New” Exclusionary Rule Debate: From “Still 
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purpose as well.89 The Dutch Supreme Court requires courts to reason whether 
evidence exclusion is necessary in order to achieve “norm-compliant” behav-
iour by law enforcement authorities.90 Swiss courts had used the deterrence 
argument already in 1949. It was argued that illegally recorded evidence must 
be excluded to prevent the spread of “investigative measures of totalitarian 
states”.91 The ECtHR recognizes deterrence too. In Gäfgen it acknowledged that 
if evidence obtained by inhuman treatment is admitted this “might be an 
incentive for law-enforcement officers to use such methods”.92
A second argument is that evidence exclusion is necessary for the protec-
tion of rights.93 Defendants have certain rights that need to be protected in the 
context of criminal proceedings. Evidence obtained in violation of these rights 
needs to be excluded as a remedy for the violation of the defendant’s rights. In 
Dutch literature this justification can be found in the “reparation argument”. 
Police and prosecution should not benefit from the violation of the defendant’s 
rights and the best way to ‘repair’ such violations is to exclude illegally obtained 
evidence.94 The Dutch Schutznorm and the Swiss validity rules are also about 
protection of rights. The basic question in both of these arguments is whether 
the procedural norm breached was designed to protect fundamental rights of 
Preoccupied with 1985” to “Virtual Deterrence”’, 37 Fordham Urban Law Journal (2009) 
743–801, at 756; R.M. Re, supra (fn. 46), p. 1894 ff.; R.M. Bloom and D.H. Fentin, 
‘A More Majestic Conception : The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the 
Exclusionary Rule’, 13 University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law (2010) 
47–80; D.A. Sklansky, ‘Is the Exclusionary Rule Obsolete?’, 5 Ohio State Journal of Criminal 
Law (2008) 567–584; T. Jacobi, ‘The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule’, 87 Notre 
Dame Law Review (2011) 585–675.
89 G.J.M. Corstens and M.J. Borgers, Het Nederlandse strafprocesrecht (Deventer: Kluwer, 
2014) p. 817 ff.; L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), p. 257 ff.; L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 81), p. 456; S. Gless, 
supra (fn. 11), Art 141 N 6; R. Fornito, supra (fn. 1), p. 57 f.; H. Vest and A. Eicker, supra (fn. 1), 
p. 891; S. Gless and J. Martin supra (fn. 5), p. 162 ff.
90 See above Section 3.2.
91 Obergericht des Kantons Bern, ii. Strafkammer, 21. Februar 1949, i.S. Sch. und M., 
88 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins (1952) p. 86.
92 ECtHR, Gäfgen v. Germany [gc], no. 22978/05, para. 178; see also M. Caianiello, supra 
(fn. 29), p. 321.
93 A. Ashworth, ‘Excluding Evidence as Protecting Rights’, 3 Criminal Law Review (1977) 
723–735; J.D. Jackson and S.J. Summers, supra (fn. 23), p. 155; see also R.M. Re, supra 
(fn. 46), p. 1907 and ; S. Gless and J. Martin supra (fn.5), p. 165.
94 W.E.C.A. Valkenburg, in P.C. van Duyne (ed.), Cross border crime in a changing Europe 
(Huntington, ny: Nova Science Publishers, 2001), p. 222 ff.; G.J.M. Corstens and 
M.J. Borgers, supra (fn. 89), p. 816 ff.
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the accused. However, the exclusionary rule is focused on the protection of fair 
trial rights, violations of privacy rights rarely lead to evidence exclusion.95
According to a third argument the main purpose of evidence exclusion is to 
restore the moral integrity of the criminal justice system.96 The underlying rea-
soning is that the use of illegally obtained evidence makes the court an accom-
plice to the violation.97 The Dutch “demonstration argument” is very similar. 
By excluding unlawfully obtained evidence, courts demonstrate that the gov-
ernment is as much bound by the law as its citizens.98 This reasoning can also 
be found in the ECtHR’s case law regarding violations of Article 3. “Torture 
evidence is excluded to protect the integrity of the trial process and, ultimately, 
the rule of law itself.”99 The Swiss doctrine argues that exclusion is a means to 
restore confidence in the criminal law system.100 The trust in the system not 
only hinges on the fact that but also how a wrongdoer is convicted.101
4.3 “The Bigger the Crime…”
Courts often decide on evidence exclusion in a weighing-up exercise. The private 
interests of the accused are balanced against the public interests in truth-finding 
and conviction. The graver the alleged crime the more the public interests pre-
vail. Many have argued that this balancing approach is conceptually miscon-
ceived.102 Its underlying assumption is that the public interests can be opposed 
to individual procedural rights. One could argue that these are not opposing 
interests but both parts of the common endeavour to seek a just verdict. Truth 
cannot trump rights. Legitimate truth in criminal proceedings presupposes 
95 See above Section 3.3.
96 Y. Merin, ‘Lost Between the Fruits of the Tree: In Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model 
for the Exclusion of Derivative Evidence’, 18 New Criminal Law Review (2015) 273–329, at 
279.
97 P. Duff, ‘Admissibility of Improperly Obtained Physical Evidence in the Scottish Criminal 
Trial: The Search for Principle’, 8 Edinburgh Law Review (2004) 152–176, at 172; for the 
reverse argument to admit slightly tainted evidence in order to protect the system’s moral 
integrity see P. Mirfield, Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997) p. 31 f.
98 G.J.M. Corstens and M.J. Borgers, supra (fn. 89), p. 817.
99 ECtHR, Othman (Abu Qatada) v. The United Kingdom, no. 8139/09, para. 264.
100 S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 84; R. Fornito, supra (fn. 1), p. 60 f.
101 See L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), p. 32; see also F. Dencker, Verwertungsverbote im Strafprozess, 
Ein Beitrag zur Lehre von den Beweisverboten (Cologne: Heymann, 1977) p. 56 ff.
102 S.C. Thaman, ‘Balancing Truth Against Human Rights: A Theory of Modern Exclusionary 
Rules’, in: S.C. Thaman, ed., Exclusionary Rules in Comparative Law (Dordrecht: Springer, 
2013) p. 403 ff.; R. Fornito, supra (fn. 1), p. 248 ff.; W. Wohlers, supra (fn. 1), p. 632.
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rights. Thus doing justice in criminal proceedings means establishing the mate-
rial facts while at the same time respecting individual rights.103 A second argu-
ment is that the balancing of interests may lead to arbitrary results. As there are 
no pre-existing criteria to identify, value and compare competing interests, 
courts can use this method of judicial interpretation to reach any predetermined 
result.104 The risk is that violations of procedural rights will be relativized. In 
practice, however, balancing is widely accepted in all three jurisdictions as a tool 
to achieve equitable decisions. We thus have to examine the consequences of 
this balancing practice in serious criminal cases.
We have shown that courts are very reluctant to disregard evidence if a grave 
crime is at stake. In the face of a heinous crime there is enormous public pres-
sure for conviction. The seriousness of the crime at stake is thus used as an 
argument against evidence exclusion. The question is whether the seriousness 
of the crime can be a valid argument to admit illegally collected evidence.105 
We therefore have to examine the relationship between the seriousness-of-
the-crime-argument and the purposes of evidence exclusion.
Can deterrence be achieved if the crime at stake is a deciding factor in evi-
dence exclusion? Evidence is rarely excluded when a serious crime is at stake. 
This became particularly clear in the Gäfgen-case. The problem of this practice 
is that it does not deter unlawful behaviour but actually encourages it. Looking 
at the seriousness of the crime conveys a fatal message to law enforcement 
authorities. For in serious crime cases it tells the police that all measures can 
be taken regardless of the procedural rights concerned.106 So deterrence is 
undermined if the seriousness of the crime is factored into the decision on 
evidence exclusion.107
Secondly, the seriousness-of-the-crime-argument fundamentally stands at 
odds with the aim to protect rights. Nowhere is the protection of rights more 
important than in serious criminal cases. The ECtHR acknowledged this in 
Salduz. It held that early access to counsel is “particularly called for in the case 
of serious charges”.108 In Swiss law the protection of rights in serious cases is 
103 L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), pp. 51, 153; M. Thommen, supra (fn. 75), p. 267 ff.
104 On balancing of interests, see T.A. Aleinikoff, ‘Age of Balancing‘, 96 The Yale Law Journal 
(1987) 943–1005, at 945.
105 Denied by W. Wohlers, supra (fn. 1), p. 632; R. Fornito, supra (fn. 1), p. 250; H. Vest and 
A. Eicker, supra (fn. 1), p. 891.
106 L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), p. 25.
107 See on the relation between the nature of procedural rules and the sanction for their 
breach M. Caianiello, supra (fn. 29), p. 319.
108 ECtHR, Salduz v. Turkey [gc], no. 36391/02, para. 54.
 85The Bigger the Crime, the Smaller the Chance of a Fair Trial?
european journal of crime, criminal law and criminal justice 24 (2016) 65-86
held in very low esteem. Evidence obtained in violation of validity-rules can be 
admitted if “its use is essential to solving serious criminal offences”.109 Dutch 
case law shows a similar tendency.110 Consequently, if evidence is only excluded 
in minor cases the objective of protecting rights is clearly missed. There should 
on the contrary be particular emphasis on the lawfulness of the evidence tak-
ing in serious cases.111
A third goal is the protection of the moral integrity of the criminal justice 
system. If the state disregards procedural rules in the prosecution of heinous 
crimes it fatally undermines its own moral integrity. The message is: We respect 
rules only if nothing is at stake. The moral integrity argument is grounded in 
the rule of law. As the Cantonal Court of Berne stated already in 1949, the use 
of illegally collected evidence is an unworthy investigative measure in a state 
avowed to the rule of law.112 In Jalloh the ECtHR held that the use of coercively 
obtained evidence would indirectly legitimise this morally reprehensible con-
duct and “afford brutality the cloak of law”.113
This brings us to the core question of this paper. Is the gravity of the crime 
at stake a valid factor in deciding on evidence exclusion? To look at the alleged 
crime when assessing the admissibility has perplexed consequences. The more 
serious the crime, the more likely it becomes that unlawfully obtained evi-
dence is admitted at trial. In Schenk it was held that the exclusion of evidence 
would lead to “absurd results”.114 At first sight, this argument seems to be 
grounded in common sense. If a murder charge is at stake and it is “clear” that 
the defendant is guilty, mere technicalities of the procedure should not stand 
in the way of a conviction. However, a closer look shows that the use of the 
severity-argument leads to absurd results. If illegally obtained evidence is admit-
ted because a serious crime is at stake this means — on a general level — that 
if only a crime is grave enough any violation of procedural rules can be justi-
fied.115 The argument ultimately suggests that the crime of the defendant 
can make up for the crimes of the police. All this results in the provocative 
109 Article 141 ii ccp/ch (Summers, fn. 9).
110 See fn. 54.
111 A. Ashworth, Human rights, serious crime and criminal procedure (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2002), p. 115.
112 og/be, supra (fn. 91), p. 86.
113 ECtHR, Jalloh v. Germany [gc], no. 54810/00, para. 105 citing the United States Supreme 
Court’s judgment in the Rochin case.
114 Federal Supreme Court Decision of 7 September 1983, cited after ECtHR, Schenk v. 
Switzerland [Plenary], no. 10862/84 para. 30 (=bge 109 Ia 244 consid. 2b).
115 L. Vetterli, supra (fn. 1), p. 63; S. Gless, supra (fn. 11), Article 141 N 84.
Thommen and Samadi
european journal of crime, criminal law and criminal justice 24 (2016) 65-86
86
question put up in the title of this paper: The bigger the crime the smaller the 
chance to a fair trial.
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